Abstract: In modern democracies, moral experts play an increasingly important role in law-making. Apart from the question of which competences characterize moral experts, their inuence on the legitimacy of democratic procedures must be discussed. On the one hand, the contribution of moral experts promises to improve the quality of decisionmaking. On the other hand, however, moral experts cannot claim to represent the will of the people. In this essay, at rst a concept of the moral expert will be sketched which does without the assumption of a privileged access to`moral truths'. Then a procedural understanding of democratic legitimacy without epistemic components will be defended. Finally there will be a distinction between the purely consultative and the quasi-legislative tasks of ethics committees. Whereas councelling by moral experts does not inuence the legitimacy of democratic procedures, giving them quasilegislative functions is connected to risks in this respect.
Introduction
Both in Germany and in other modern democracies, an increasing demand for moral expertise can be observed. Ethics committees are increasingly asked for their advice both in the context of law-making and the implementation of laws.
The growing political signicance of the expertise provided by moral philosophers raises two questions. Firstly, it must be discussed in how far ideas of expertise as they are known from the natural sciences can be applied to the eld of morality.
In particular it must be decided which specic skills the relevant philosopher has in comparison to other people contributing to normative controversies. Secondly, the role of moral experts in political decision-making must be critically analyzed.
In this context we must ask in which way the inclusion of ethics committees or other commissions aect the legitimacy of democratic procedures.
In the here presented article I will most of all discuss the latter question.
I will shortly deal with the concept of the moral expert only in the following section, to get a point of reference for further analysis (2). Then I will sketch the most important conditions democratic procedures must meet to be considered legitimate. For this purpose, I will base my considerations on distinguishing the legitimacy and the quality of decision-making processes from each other (3). By the next step I will have a closer look at the role moral experts may play with passing and implementing laws. Starting out from dierentiating between consultative and quasi-legislative functions, I will ask about possible consequences for the legitimacy of democratic procedures (4). As a conclusion, I will then shortly sum up the results of the analysis.
What, If at All, Do Moral Philosophers Know Better?
The idea of the moral expert to which I will refer in the following can be characterized as being negative at rst sight. An expert in the eld of morality may not claim to be able to decide authoritatively about normative questions. He/she does not have any privileged insights into`moral truths' which are dierent from those of ordinary people. Fundamental meta-ethical objections make us doubt the existence and recognizability of moral facts. Already John Mackie (1981, 409) formulated two crucial objections so called Moral Realism is confronted with. On the one hand, he states,`moral facts' must be entities which are fundamentally dierent from everything else in the world. Accordingly, identifying them would have to be based on a specic capability which is dierent from all other known ways of gaining insight (argument from queerness). On the other hand, he says, we all know that those values as being predominant for the various societies and cultures are considerably dierent from each other. The existence of very dierent normative convictions at least strongly indicates the non-existence of`moral truths' (argument from relativity).
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Furthermore, no model which makes a claim to truth will be able to meet the expectations which are in practice connected to ethical councelling. E.g. those moral experts giving their opinion on a new medical technology will often come to dierent conclusions. If they judge dierently on a normative question, there results an irreconcilable confrontation of contradicting claims to truth. Other people participating in the debate have no possibility to decide about which claim to truth is justied. In so far, morality experts referring to higher insights are little helpful for decision-making. If they want to be heard, they must explain their positions and answer critical questions. Thus, after all they are subject to the same demands placed on reason-giving as they are valid also for other participants in the debate. They are not forced to give up in principle on their claims to truth, however in the context of practical work in a commission they must`bracket them out' if they want to inuence decision-making.
However, moral expertise need not necessarily be understood as a higher kind of knowledge which is inaccessible to the ordinary citizen. Rightly so, Dieter Birnbacher (2012, 241f.) 2 The specic skills 1 On this see in more detail the contribution by Jones and Schroeter (2012, 221227) in this edition.
which make a moral expert can basically be summed up by four aspects. First, moral philosophers have dealt in detail with the analysis of moral questions in a variety of contexts. Thus, usually they have developed a particular`power of judgment', i.e. they are particularly capable of identifying the normatively relevant aspects of a matter. Second, they are familiar with the most important positions of moral philosophy as they have been supported both in the historical and the contemporary debate. Thus they may reach back to a broad range of theoretical concepts and arguments which they may apply to the respective eld of problems. Third, moral philosophersat least in the ideal casehave a theoretically distanced attitude towards normative questions. Accordingly, they will try to avoid any emotional concernment or taking of sides of individual parties involved in the matter they are supposed to judge on. Finally, usually moral philosophers feel obliged to fundamental standards of rational argumentation.
E.g. they will not simply refer to`tradition' or the`nature of things' but will attempt to give clear, criticisable reasons for their positions.
The above sketched skills allow experts to full important tasks on behalf of those councelling committees they participate in. They are capable of identifying the normatively relevant aspects of a eld of problems and to inform about the leading moral theories. Furthermore, they are capable of classifying and rationalising positions supported in public debates or in the course of debates in the committee. Accordingly, they are able to uncover the theoretical background assumptions of stated arguments and make clear their implications for judging on other situations. Apart from informing about available arguments and clarifying the positions supported, however, experts are free to judge personally on the problems under debate (see Birnbacher 2012, 240241) . In this context, they must give reasons why certain arguments shall have more weight and why objections to them shall be considered insucient. In the ideal case, however, experts should change their role in a transparent way, i.e. it should be obvious for other members of the committee if they simply refer to moral expert knowledge or make their own judgment. Secondly, decisions made in modern democracies can be judged on according to quality criteria. In some cases the qualitative judgement may refer to the content of the legal measures passed by the parliament. However, for this an objective criterion is needed which allows for distinguishing`correct' from`wrong' regulation. Thus, e.g. the legal determination of an emission limit may be called correct' if it actually rules out health hazards. However, often legislative initiatives do not (or not only) serve for dening technological standards, rather the citizens' values and goals are in the focus. Accordingly, e.g. in the eld of social legislation it is primarily about the dierent preferences and normative convictions the voters have regarding welfare state institutions.
The quality of legal measures which raise moral questions cannot be judged on according to the criterion of topical correctness. If one believes the idea of moral truths' to be wrong, it looks plausible to grant that there may possibly be reasonable disagreement (see Rawls 1998, 12734) . As then it is not possible to give clear solutions which must be considered`correct', the content of a legal regulation cannot decide about its quality. The quality of a decision must quite essentially be explained by the way in which it was made. Of particular importance in this context is the expertise of those contributing to the decision and their readiness to impartially discuss the relevant normative arguments. Thus, procedural aspects are essential for the quality of parliamentary decisions.
Although the criteria of`legitimacy' and`quality' have in common that they are procedure-oriented, nevertheless they may lead to dierent judgements on democratic decisions. E.g. abiding by the parliamentary procedures stipulated by democratic constitutions does not guarantee the MPs' expertise. In so far decisions which meet the above sketched legitimacy standards may be characterized by a high degree of incompetence. However, criticizing a legal regulation as being improper does not imply objecting its democratic legitimacy. Indeed, the 
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Epistemic conceptions are problematic in so far as they are only capable of providing a contingent justication of democracy. Basically it may be imagined that in political elds requiring special knowledge decisions made by experts prove to be superior. If pure expert procedures lead to better results, they will have to be recognized as legitimate, although they cannot claim to represent the will of the people. Furthermore, epistemic conceptions assume the availability of procedure-independent criteria of right or wrong. However, much legislation is connected to normative questions which cannot be answered according to objective standards.
Two Functions of Moral Experts
Basically we may distinguish two ways in which moral experts could inuence the passing and implementing of democratic laws. In the following I will at rst discuss bodies which have a purely councelling function in the process of political decision-making. Thenby the example of a revision of Germany's embryo protection lawI will discuss moral experts having quasi-legislative functions.
Regarding the rst variant, a look at the standing orders of the German Bundestag is worthwhile, which oers two possibilities to consult experts in the context of decision-making processes. On the one hand, experts appointed by the respective parliamentary committee may be consulted on a particular mat-ter during public hearings. If the discussed matter shows ethical implications, also moral philosophers or moral theologists may be asked for their advice. In such cases it is the task of the experts to point out moral problems to the decision-makers and to present normative arguments in favour of or against the options under discussion. On the other hand, the German Bundestag may establish Enquete Commissions to prepare decision-making about extensive and signicant matters. Preimplantation diagnostic according to Section 2 is legal only after an interdisciplinary ethics committee established at the ocially approved centres for preimplantation diagnostics has evaluated the conditions set by Section 2 and has stated its approval.
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Those ethics committees as being supposed to be established at ocially approved medical centres for preimplantation diagnostics are not given the task of counselling the legislature when it comes to deciding a norm. Rather, their moral expertise is meant to become important in the context of each individual case of referring to 3a of the Law on Embryo Protection. The ethics committees take over a quasi-legislative function in so far as the legislature has consciously dened the term`grave hereditary disease' only vaguely. To decide in each individual case if the conditions of Sect. 2 are met, they must determine if the diagnosed hereditary disease may be considered`grave'. Thus, they specify the legal norm in a way which signicantly aects its implementation. By classifying a hereditary disease as being`grave' or`not grave' they decide about the legality of preimplantation diagnostic. 11 More dicult to answer is the question of how a transfer of quasi-legislative tasks will aect the legitimacy of decision-making.
As explained in the previous section, in democratic states the will of the people must be considered the only source of legitimacy. A decision is legitimate if it is in accordance with the rules of proceeding which, under the conditions of modern mass societies, guarantee that the will of the people is represented. 
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However, it is doubtful to which extend the legislature is authorized to delegate norm setting competences to ethics committees. If the actual content of legal norms is very often determined by moral (or other) experts, there is the danger that democracy will be`undermined'. Then, important parts of lawmaking would be left to bodies of experts which could neither be appointed by the citizens nor be held responsible. The fact that basically the transfer of quasi-legislative functions on ethics committees can be revised is not sucient to dispel the above mentioned concerns. To be sure, by way of amendments the parliament is able to withdraw transferred competences. However, as long as ethics committees are entitled to make decisions, they will create legal facts which cannot easily be corrected. Both in terms of democracy theory and of constitutional law it is not suciently clear where the limts must be drawn when it comes to legitimately transferring quasi-legislative functions to ethics committees. Bibliography
